Epistemology

Appendix II

Qualities

by Reginald Firehammer

Existence consistent of all the things that exist. I refer to the things that exist as existents. Physical existents may also be referred to as entities, but exitents with other modes of existence, such as "feelings" or "concepts" are not entities, though they are existents.

Since we know from ontology's principles of identity that every existent's identity, its nature, its differentiation from all other existents, and its relationships to all other existents, are all determined by that existent's qualities, if we are to understand the nature of existence at all, it is imperative we understand the nature of qualities.

"Qualities" refers to any of an existent's attributes, characteristics, or properties, which are all only aspects of an existents total nature as the existent it is. It is very important to understand those qualities do not "make" the existent what it is in some causitive sense. The qualities of an existent are what they are because the existent is what it is. The qualities of existents, themselves, only exist as qualities of existents and have no independent existence apart from those existents.

Though they do not have any independent existence, qualities do exist, and like all existents have qualities themselves, which defined the kind of qualities they are. The nature of the differences in qualities is crucial to epistemology. To understand those difference, qualities can be explained in terms of their categories. [Needs work]

There are, of course, as many qualities as there are existents (actually more, since every existent has many qualities). To attempt to understand existence in terms of all possible qualities is hopeless. But it is unnecessary to identify every possible quality of every possible existent to understand the nature of the qualities that our world's existence is comprised of, because, like all other existents and our understanding of them, all qualities can be subsumed under a limited number of kinds or categories. Here then are the categories of all possible qualities. [Needs work]

The first qualities we are conscious of are the qualities of perception, those we are directly aware of, the colors we see, the scents we smell, the sounds we hear, the flavors we taste, and the sensations we feel. Since the subject of perception has been fully addressed, it is only necessary here to emphasize the nature of those qualities as they relate to qualities in general.

The perceptual qualities are the actual qualities of physical existents directly available to consciousness through the neurological system. We obviously know a great deal more about physical existents, including physical, chemical, and, in the case of living organisms, biological attributes which we cannot directly perceive, but all we know about physical existents we know by means of those qualities which we can perceive.

The perceivable qualities are all determined by the entire nature of existents. All of an entity's attributes (its identity) are implied by those qualities which can be directly perceived. No attribute of an existent can be changed without changing some aspect of how that existent is or can be perceived.

Most of the qualities of existents that can be directly perceived are indirect. The direct perceptual qualities are limited to color and intensity (vision) pitch, harmonics, and loudness (hearing) scents, tastes, and the feelings of cold, pressure, and muscle response, as well as number of internal perceptions such as balance, for example.

Some philosophers, like Locke, knew there was a difference in the qualities of things as perceived, but their attempts to explain the difference did more harm to philosophy than good, resulting in such false ideas as primary and secondary attributes. All the attributes of an existent that are perceived are attributes of the existent, period; the difference is in whether there is a "percept" that directly corresponds to the attribute of the entity being perceived, or whether the attribute is perceived as a configuration of percepts. The latter I refer to as indirect perceptual qualities.

Visually, the only "percepts" we have are color and brightness. By means of those percepts we directly perceive the color and brightness of the entities we see. There are, however, no "percepts" corresponding to all the other attributes of the things we perceive visually, such as shape, size, and relative positions. We perceive those attributes of entities by means of the "percepts" of color and brightness indirectly, as configurations of color and brightness.

This does not mean we do not truly perceive those other attributes—we do perceive them, but we do not perceive them as percepts, we perceive them as what they actually are, configurations or patterns of those colors and intensity as they exist or appear in the entities themselves.

For example, consider a tomato (a really nicely formed deep gorgeous red one). We can directly perceive the color of the tomato (a deep gorgeous red) and since the tomato is round, the "gorgeous red" percept in our visual field will be round as well. There is no percept, "round," however; the roundness is an attribute of the particular percept of "gorgeous red" we have when seeing a tomatoe.

While the perception we have of a tomato is, in our visual field, a patch of "round redness" the "redness" is a direct perception of the color of the tomato, and the "roundness" is an indirect perception resulting from the fact the tomato itself is round, and only presents redness in that configuration to our senses to be perceived.

It is not my intention to correct every mistake that has plagued philosophy, but some a so common they have become ingrained and accepted without question. The idea of primary and secondary qualities is one of them.

The fact that the means by which we perceive color and shape is different is irrelevant to the "type" of qualities these are as attributes of existents. They are different kinds of qualities, but both are real qualities of the entities that exist as attributes of those existents whether anyone perceives them or not.

The mistaken view of Locke and other 16th and 17th century philosophers, which is still taught and widely held, supposes that only primary qualities are actual attributes of things, existing in the "external" world just as they are perceived, but that secondary qualities do not actually exist in things perceived and only exist as perceptions. Primary qualities, it is supposed, are all measurable and include shape, size, distance, weight, and temperature, for example. Secondary qualities are not supposedly measurable and include color, taste, texture, scent, and sound, for example.

If there were a difference in these kinds of qualities, other than the fact they are different attributes of things, it is what are call "secondary" qualtities which are the truly primary. We see color, taste flavors, feel textures, smell oders and hear sounds directly, and without those direct percepts, we could not perceive the so-called "primary" attributes at all. We perceive all the qualities by means of these. We see the roundness of an apple, for example, because we directly perceive its redness, but we see it's roundness only because the redness we directly perceive is round.

The claim of the primary/secondary falacy is that while a thing's shape is exactly as it is perceived, it's color, as it is perceived, is only in our mind, not actually in the entity, that is, "there is no redness in a red apple." The redness we consciously perceive is, however, in the apple, and it is a real attribute of the apple in exactly the same we roundness is an attribute of an apple. The color of an entity is determined by it's nature, just as it's shape is, or it's weight is. An entity's color is determined by those characteristics that determine the wave-length of the light it will reflect, trasnmit, or emit, all measureable characteristics, by the way.

If there were no color in the apple, no other attribute of an apple, such as its shape, or size, or position could be seen. The primary/secondary dichotomy absurdly asserts that we are conscious of all things by means of our direct consciousness of what does not exist—if redness does not exist as an attribute of an apple our perception of red would be a perception of what does not exist.

Intrinsic qualities, also called "natural" qualities, are all the properties, attributes, and characteristics an entity has independent of its relationship to any other entity or entities. Intrinsic qualities are also called natural qualities because they are the qualities that determine what an entity is, that is, its nature or identity, as a member of a class of entities. A particular entities identity includes its relationship to other entities.

The intrinsic qualities include all perceptual qualities, like color, texture, size, shape, and weight, which we see, hear, feel smell, and taste. They include all those qualities we discover by studying entities as they are perceived, such as their chemical makeup, physical structure, as well as thermal, electrical, and mechanical characteristics, for example. They also include attributes that cannot possibly be directly perceived, such as atomic and subatomic components and structure.

There are two kinds ofrelative qualities. The obvious kind of relative qualitie are all those an entity has determined by its relationship to other entities. The other kind are actually intrinsic qualities expressed in abstract relative terms.

[Note: intrinsic vs. relative qualities pertain all kinds of existents, not just physical entities, though most of this discussion is in terms of entities.]

Relative qualities are all those qualities of things which are determined by their relationship to other existents, both physical and conceptual. For example, an existent's position or geographic location is obviously a real but relative quality determined by its relationship to other entities; the thing would still be what it is if it were somewhere else. Other relative qualities are, for example, uncle (if ones brother or sister has no children the person who would otherwise be an uncle is not, but it still the same person), and many others like, "recently discovered," "important," "lost," "found," "wanted" as well as the ordinal (not the fraction) "fifth," which can applied to people ("the fifth girl in line"), a series of events, ("the fifth race"), or ideas, ("the fifth principle"), for example.

The relative qualities can all be defined without reference to the intrinsic or natural qualities of entities. However, it is an entity's nature, defined by its intrinsic or natural qualities that determines what kind relationships it must or may have to other entities. A girl can be the fifth in line, but she cannot be an uncle.

Since there are entities which are identical in terms of their intrinsic or natural qualities (molecules of water, for example) it is the relative qualities that differentiate them. When existents are identical in every other way, the only possible difference they can have are relative ones, for example, a positional difference. It must be noted that even when entities are well differentiated by intrinsic qualities, they are also differentiated by the relative qualities they would be even if intrinsically identical.

For example, we might have three balls that were identical in every way, color, material, size, weight, density, and so on. To be three balls, and not one, they must be differentiated in some way. In this case, they would be differentiated by position. They could not be in the same place at the same time.

They could be further differentiated by other relative qualities as well. Two might be stationary, relative to each other and the third, moving, or they might all be moving, but at different rates of speed.

Suppose we alter the balls so that not only their relative qualities are different, but their intrinsic qualities are different as well. We could paint them different colors, bore a hole in one of them, or swap one out for a ball made of a different material, with a different weight and density.

The balls are now differentiated by the differences in their intrinsic qualities, and can be identified by those qualities without reference to any relative qualities. It is very important to note, however, if the balls are in exactly the same positions they were before, and are behaving in exactly the same way they were before, the relative qualities are all exactly the same as they were before their intrinsic qualities were changed.

Intrinsic qualities expressed in abstract relative terms is more subtle, but much more important. For example, an entity's size can be directly perceived, and is an attribute of the entity itself, an aspect of its nature, and does not depend on its relationship to any other entity. As a concept, however, size is a relative quality and must be expressed in relative terms. The definition of any concept of size is in relationship to some "standard" unit of measure, which can be anything that has size as an attribute.

Necessary qualities are all the qualities existents have that they must have to be the kind of existents they are and without which they cannot be those kinds of existents. In the case of a single existent the necessary qualities are all those it must have to be the existent it is. Necessary qualities also exclude any qualities of an existent that would make it a different kind of existent.

Possible qualities are all those qualities that an existent may have but does not necessarily have, including all those qualities that may change without the existent becoming a different existent or a different kind of existent. Possible qualities also include all possible relationships an existent may have to other existents. The necessary qualities determine what qualities are possible to an existent.

Immutable necessary qualities are those qualities that cannot change for a given kind of existent or particular existent. An existent always has the same immutable necessary qualities or ceases to be that existent or kind of existent. An individual, for example, matures, may gain or loose weight, learns, lives in different places, but always remains the same individual so long as he lives. The immutable qualities that identify an individual as that individual never change, even if those attributes are not known.

Mutable necessary qualities pertain only to individual or particular existent and are those qualities that can change, but are the qualities of an existent "at the moment." The mutable necessary qualities may change or may be true sometimes and not at other times, but are true of the existent at the time the existent is being identified. For example, a person's weight may change, but at any particular time that weight will have a specific value. For that person at that specific time that weight is a necessary quality, if the person had a different weight at that moment, it would be a different person.

The distinctions I have made in qualities eliminate some of the philosophical baggage usually associated with the concepts of essential vs. accidental qualities. I also prefer the terms necessary and possible, because the meaning of essential in epistemology, especially for definitions, is a different concept, and the two are easily confused.

Actual relative qualities, however, are, necessary though not intrinsic. They are necessary because the existent could not be that existent if it did not have those qualities, that is, for example, it were someplace else. (Harry is actually Bill's uncle. Harry could not actually be Harry if he were not Bill's uncle. But, Harry would still be Harry if Bill had never been born. Harry's nature (intrinsic qualities) are not determined by his relationship to Bill, but Harry's actual existense as Harry must include as part of his necessary qualities his relationship as uncle to Bill.

The other relative qualities are those conceptual qualities by which attributes of entities are described ....... for example, the description of an entities geometic shape in terms of geometry and linear measure. Specifically, these are the "abstract relative qualities, " in terms of which, ontologically, all other qualities of physical existents can be described. The abstract relative qualities are all conceptual qualities, not directly perceived. All of the perceptual qualities can be described entirely in terms of the abstract relative qualities.

Conceptual Qualities There are several different kinds of conceptual qualities.... The qualities of concepts themselves as existents qualities about conceptual existents some examples: "recently discovered," "important," "lost," "found," "wanted" as well as the ordinal (not the fraction) "fifth," which can applied to people ("the fifth girl in line"), a series of events, ("the fifth race"), or ideas, ("the fifth principle"), for example. Conceptual qualities include:

—qualities which treat a concept as though it were an attribute. For example, metalic, from metal, human or manness from man, medicinal from medicine, redness from red, just from justice, ethical from ethics, chemical (as in a "chemical smell,") from chemical or chemistry, and married from marriage. The concepts from which such qualities are derived may themselves be concepts for qualities, like, "red," (a perceptual quality) and, "married," (a legal state). These derived qualities may also be treated as concepts, as all qualities can, such as ethicalness and chemicalness.

—qualities derived as analogies from attributes of perceived material exitents or existence such as above (these concepts are above their understanding), in (included in the concept justice), grasp (he finally grasped the meaning), higher (a much higher priority), hot (this is a really hot issue). The perceptually analogous qualities included all those used to describe physical and scientifically established characteristic of physical existence, for example: an atoms "shape," a "field," or any of the sub-atomic "particles."

—All those qualitites Ayn Rand would classify as concepts of consciousness, perceptual, perceptive, thoughtful, rational, reasoneable, remembered, imagined, imaginary, dreamed, dreamy, critical, judgemental, reminiscent, etc.

—All those qualities derived from the emotions and feelings. (Note: while the emotions and feelings are percepts, they are not perceptions of any particular existent—except our own body—but of a general state or condition, the reaction of our entire physical nature to the content of consciousness. Our concepts of the emotions are entirely conceptual, because they are all associations of specific feelings with those things we have discovered are their cause.)

—Conceptual qualities include all those qualities of perceived (physical) existents which are not directly perceived, such as an entities chemical make-up and atomic structure, its electrical characteristics, for example. Notice, that all of these attributes must be conceived by means of conceptual qualities, most frequently, perceptually analogous qualities, else there is no way to "grasp," them. (Note that all our concepts must ultimately be driven back to the only mode of conscious we have, perception, being based both on the chain of reason from perceived existence our most sublime abstractions, but even in describing those sublime concepts, the terms must at least be analogous to that we can directly perceive, or they cannot be comprehended.)

Intrinsic qualities are also called "natural" qualities, because they are the qualities that determine an existent's nature. (They might be called "essential," also, except this word has special significance in the definition of a concept/word) The intrinsic qualities are the necessary qualities excluding any immediate possible or relative qualities.

(Intrinsic qualities are those which are identified with an existent as though it existed independently of any other existents, but must be consistent with all possible relationships with other existents.)

Relative qualities actually refer to two different, but related kinds of qualities. First, are all those qualities of things which are determined by their relationship to other existents, both physical and conceptual. For example, an existents position or geographic location is a real but relative quality; the thing would still be what it is if it were somewhere else. Other relative qualities are, for example, uncle (if ones brother or sister has no children the person who would otherwise be an uncle is not, but it still the same person), and many others like, "recently discovered," "important," "lost," "found," "wanted."